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Abstract
The political ramifications of hosting mega-events are huge.  In this article, we investigate the 
relationships among corruption, transparency, knowledge, and public trust using data 
collected from 3786 Brazilians in the context of the 2014 FIFA World Cup Games.  Findings 
from the structural equation modeling indicate that public trust in government is determined 
by the respondents’ perceptions of corruption and transparency and their level of knowledge 
about the roles of government and the local organizing committee in the mega-event.  The 
respondents’ level of trust in the local organizing committee also exerts an influence on their 
trust in the government.  The implications of the findings for governments planning to host 
mega-events in the future are discussed.  This research makes an important contribution to 
the literature, being the first study to test a theoretical model that analyses the relationships 
between corruption, transparency, knowledge, and public trust in the context of a mega-sport 
event.
Keywords: mega-events; public trust; corruption; transparency; governance; tourism; FIFA 
World Cup
21. Introduction 
Definitions of mega events vary across disciplines and theoretical underpinnings (Horne, 
2017).  Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that mega-events are large-scale cultural, 
commercial or sporting events which have a dramatic character, mass population appeal, and 
international significance (Roche, 2000).  They are one-off events which are very costly and 
have far-reaching socio-economic implications, but have worldwide popularity and generate 
much media attention (Müller, 2015a).  From this perspective, a mega-event is an important 
component of the tourism system and has important implications for the host area (Getz and 
Page, 2016; Jones, 2001).  Mega sport tourism events such as the Fédération Internationale de 
Football Association (FIFA) World Cup are perceived to have a number of positive socio-
economic impacts (Arnegger and Herz, 2016; Bakhsh, Potwarka, Nunkoo, and Sunnassee, 
2017; Maharaj, 2015; Potwarka and Banyai, 2016).  It is therefore not surprising that 
governments of host countries invest large amounts of resources in bidding for and hosting 
such events.  In the neoliberal era, the ‘sport-for-good’ narrative has been replaced by the 
‘sport-for-development’ narrative to justify use of public resources for hosting mega-events 
(Coakley and Souza, 2013).
However, these events rarely live to the expectations of the public and empirical results on 
the impacts of hosting are disappointing.  Not only are the economic benefits overstated and 
promoters failed to deliver their promises (Jones, 2001), but mega sport events also generate 
a number of negative externalities and social costs.  Corruption and lack of transparency are 
probably among the most documented unethical practices inherent to mega sport events.  
Despite the codes of practice established by sports federations like FIFA which include such 
directives as accountability, ethics, anti-corruption safeguards, and respect for the rule of law 
(Gaffney, 2013), there is no dearth of evidence of corrupt practices and intransparency in the 
organization of mega sport events (see for example Maharaj, 2015; Longman, 1999).  
3Corruption and lack of transparency represent a direct betrayal of public trust placed in mega-
event planning institutions, since such practices revolve around situations where government 
officials and developers entrusted by the public engage in malfeasance for private enrichment 
(Bardhan, 1997).  Distrust results in public protests against the political system, giving rise to 
a legitimacy crisis in mega-event planning and development.  
Despite such political consequences, there is a dearth of studies on this topic in the tourism 
literature.  Although in recent years, tourism researchers have shown a growing research 
interest on public trust (e.g. Gursoy, Yolal, Ribeiro, and Netto, 2017; Nunkoo, 2015; Olya 
and Gavilyan, 2017), none of them has looked at the theoretical relationships between public 
trust and corruption, transparency, and knowledge.  As Henne (2015) and Getz and Page 
(2016) argue, there is little empirical evidence on the political consequences of corruption 
and transparency in the mega tourism event literature. Furthermore, existing empirical 
evidences on trust cannot be generalized to mega events because trust is context-specific as it 
is “given to specific individuals or institutions over specific domains” (Levi and Stoker, 
2000, p. 476).  From these perspectives, this research makes some important theoretical 
contributions to knowledge as it connects together the research on corruption and 
transparency with the study of public trust in two important bodies involved in the 
organization of the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil: the Brazilian government and the Local 
Organizing Committee (LOC) of the games.  The research uses data collected from 3786 
respondents residing in the 12 Brazilian cities that hosted the World Cup games. 
The paper proposes a baseline model (BM, Figure 1a) that predicts public trust in the 
government (TG) and public trust in the LOC (TOC) of the games from corruption (COR), 
transparency (TRA), and knowledge (KW).  We then compare the BM with four competing 
models of public trust that reflect other theoretically plausible relationships among the 
4variables.  This approach is necessary given the alternative and sometimes conflicting 
theoretical relationships among the variables revealed in previous research (Nunkoo, 
Ramkissoon, and Gursoy, 2013).  Following existing studies (e.g. Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012; 
Grimmelikhuijsen, Porumbescu, Hong and Im, 2013), CM1 (Figure 1b) proposes two 
additional path relationships between transparency (TRA) and knowledge (KW) and between 
KW and COR while CM2 (Figure 1c) includes a path between TRA and COR.  In CM3 
(Figure 1d), we investigate the spill-over effect of TOC on TG.  While some studies suggest 
that corruption is an important predictor of public trust (Choi and Woo, 2016; Torcal, 2014), 
others found empirical evidence indicating that low trust leads to stronger perceptions of 
corruption (e.g. Morris and Klesner, 2010; Wroe, Allen, and Birch, 2013).  Therefore CM4 
(Figure 1e) investigates the theoretical postulates that COR is influenced by TG and TOC.  
Failure to identify such alternative theoretical propositions that can be supported by a given 
set of data presents a direct threat to future research (MacCallum, Wegener, Uchino, and 
Fabrigar, 1993).  Because research on such complex relationships among trust, corruption, 
transparency, and knowledge in the tourism and event literature is still in its infancy, it is 
important to uncover the most theoretically rigorous model from other competing ones.  Our 
approach “increase[s] the alignment of modeling results with existing knowledge and 
theories” and is thus an important step toward theoretical advancement (Shah and Goldstein 
2006, p. 162).  
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
This study also has important practical implications for the development of mega sport 
tourism events in host countries planning to host such events in future, particularly in Brazil 
where anti-corruption efforts to promote the integrity of government and sport are now more 
than ever ubiquitous.  As Spalding et al. (2014) note “…in a country where corruption has 
5been ‘business as usual’, it appears that Brazilian people have had enough… the call for 
accountability and transparency has only intensified” (p. 74).  As the anti-corruption 
movements demanding good governance and adherence to the principles of democracy in 
mega-event development become global, other host countries can also expect similar 
situations to that of Brazil and face the challenges of maintaining the legitimacy of mega-
event planning bodies.  Legitimacy of and public support for mega-events is central to their 
sustainability (Bramwell, 1997; Gursoy et al., 2017; O’Brien, 2006; Kaplanidou, Al Emadi, 
Sagas, Diop, and Fritz, 2016; Lauermann, 2016).  Government of host countries can promote 
good governance and gain legitimacy in and garner public support for mega-event 
development by fostering public trust (Park and Blenkinsopp, 2011).  This is important 
because sport organizations now consider the level of public support for the sport event as 
one of the key selection criteria to assess a potential host country (International Olympic 
Committee, 2016).  Hence, an investigation of public trust and distrust in the context of 
mega-sport events is more than ever essential, making the findings of this research valuable 
to several host economies.  
2. Public Trust in Mega Event Planning Institutions
In this study, following Miller and Listhaug (1990), we define trust as citizens’ beliefs that 
the institutions governing mega-event development will produce preferred outcomes for the 
public even in the absence of constant scrutiny.  Any government and its related institutions 
need public trust for their policies and programs to flourish (Nunkoo, 2015; Nunkoo, 
Ramkissoon, and Gursoy, 2012; Nunkoo and Smith, 2014).  Public trust fosters relationships 
underlying economic development and promotes legitimacy of governing and planning 
institutions as well as produces outcomes that work in the best interest of society (Anderson 
and Tverdova, 2003; Swaner, 2017).  People who consider institutions involved in mega-
event planning as trustworthy are more likely to support the institutions’ initiatives and 
6follow their leadership without needing to be coerced (Nunkoo, 2015; Nunkoo et al., 2012; 
Rudolph, 2017).  However, public distrust in the political system governing mega-event 
development seems to be the norm rather than the exception in contemporary mega-sport 
event development.  Although not formally acknowledged as such in the mega-event 
literature, corruption and lack of transparency in mega-event development are the primary 
causes of public distrust.  
The study of corruption, transparency, and public trust is more salient in the context of 
mega-sport events than less intrusive forms of tourism development.  The hybrid 
characteristic of mega-sport events, namely the synergies between bidding and non-bidding 
mechanisms, enabled by public-private partnerships, facilitate the pursuit of undemocratic 
actions, rendering event planning institutions susceptible to secrecy, lack of transparency, and 
corruption.  Although sport planning bodies like FIFA are non-profit organizations, they 
enjoy considerable political power due to their monopolistic position and high entry costs 
(Forster, 2016).  Furthermore, their ability to exert a strong influence on economic 
development through their command of exceptional popularity of mega-sport events, and 
their ability to dictate terms to potential host countries allow them to shelter from illegitimacy 
while transferring the impact of their intransparency and corrupt tendencies onto the host 
government.
Global sport reflects a corporatist model of development, reflecting what Henne (2015) 
labeled as ‘celebration capitalism’, which enable powerful officials of organizations like 
FIFA to coercively influence stakeholders in the quest for personal gains.  Consequently, the 
planning process of mega-events can be attuned to government, corporations, and other 
societal elites to the detriment of the wider public (Gaffney, 2013; Henne, 2015; Mules, 
1998; Ziakas, 2015).  This encourages deviations from transparent practices and perpetuates 
7public perceptions of corruption, undermining public trust in the political system governing 
mega-sport events.  For example in the case of the 2014 FIFA World Cup, bribes were 
solicited, corrupting the bidding process (Maharaj, 2015).  Such corrupt practices have also 
been common across other mega-events such as the Salt Lake City Games of 2002, the Cape 
Town 2004 Olympic bid, and 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa (Kolamo and 
Vuolteenaho, 2013; Swart and Bob, 2004).  
The corrupt and intransparent nature of mega-sport event development is detrimental to 
public trust.  Consequences of distrust include rising civic suspicion of the political 
environment, making it difficult for the government and planners to advance the mega-event 
development plans.  Distrust is often associated with mobilized modes of protestation and 
other similar activities directed against an existing system (Chen and Hua, 2015) as witnessed 
in several nations hosting mega-sport events.  One of the most violent protests was the one 
witnessed in the days before the 1968 Olympic Games hosted by Mexico City when more 
than 15,000 people gathered for a political demonstration against the games (van Luijk and 
Frisby, 2012).  The public expressed concerns over the use of public money by the 
government to host the Games (Lenskyj, 2004).  The protests caused more than 5000 soldiers 
to be mobilized and led to the death of around 300 students.  Public resistance was hailed by 
the Mexican government as a threat to the success of the Games and to social justice in the 
country (Preston and Dillon, 2004).  In his research on the anatomy of resistance, Gaffney 
(2016) discusses how massive public protests and social unrest took place before the 2013 
FIFA Confederation Cup in the different Brazilian cities, threatening the tournament.  The 
work of Lenskyj (2008), Armstrong, Hobbs, and Lindsay (2011), and Fussey, Coaffee, 
Armstrong, and Hobbs (2011) further discuss how social movements in host cities sought to 
contest the development of mega sport events.  Declining trust in the governance of mega 
sport events is a permanent feature of the contemporary mega sport tourism event discourse.  
8Although over the past years researchers have taken a more formal interest in transparency 
and corruption given the deluge of prominent scandals across the industry, the implications 
for public trust are yet to be understood.  With the political consequences of distrust, it has 
become imperative to understand the sources of public trust in mega-event planning 
institutions.  We argue here that corruption, transparency, and knowledge are important 
determinants of public trust.  These determinants are explored below.
2.1. Corruption
Corruption is defined as the abuse or misuse of power or position for private gains, 
breaching important expectations of modern societies (Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000).  
Although the occurrence of corruption is defined by broad rules and norms which differ 
across societies (Wroe et al., 2013), it is an act of transgression which violates the rule of law 
and democratic principles.  An individual who acts in a corrupt manner deviates from an 
expected conduct and such action threatens the health of the political system (Weitz-Shapiro 
and Winters, 2017).  In the absence of an objective measure of corruption, it is very common 
among researchers to measure an individual’s perception of corruption (Wroe et al., 2013).  
In a mega-sport context, corruption manifests itself at two different levels: competitive and 
organizational.  While competitive corruption attempts to influence the outcomes of the 
competition, organizational corruption, which is of interest here, adversely influences the 
organizational structure and planning of mega-sport events.
Corruption is a systemic problem in mega sporting events (see for example Kulczycki and 
Koenigstorfer, 2016; Longman, 1999; Maharaj, 2015; Spalding et al., 2014) and is often 
attributed to unbridled capitalistic pursuits coupled with abuses of political power (Henne, 
2015).  With frequent revelations of corrupt practices by the mass media and the 
accompanying rise of global anti-corruption movements, public and academic discourses on 
9corruption in mega-events have become so fervent that it is considered as a mega-event 
syndrome (Müller, 2015b).  Corruption impacts on the legitimacy of sports federations and 
planning bodies (Buraimo, Migali, and Simmons, 2016), impeding public trust (Seligson, 
2002).  Indeed, the relationship between perceived corruption and public trust has been 
validated in several studies (e.g. Choi and Woo, 2016; Pellegata and Memoli, 2016; Torcal, 
2014).  In a mega-event context, Kulczycki and Koenigstorfer (2016) found that respondents’ 
perceptions of the level of corruption adversely influenced their attitudes toward event 
planning bodies, although the researchers did not explicitly measure public trust.  Based on 
the preceding discussion, the BM of this paper proposes that Brazilians’ perceived level of 
corruption is inversely related to their trust in government and in the LOC of the games 
(COR→TG; COR→TOC). 
2.2. Transparency 
Transparency refers to the extent to which an entity reveals information about its own 
decision-making processes, procedures, functioning, and performance (Gerring and Thacker, 
2004).  The degree of transparency is the extent to which an organization allows people to 
monitor its performance and participate in its policy decision-making (Burman, Albinsson, 
and Hyatt, 2016).  Calls for greater transparency in global sports have focused on the 
appropriation of resources by officials of sports organizations like FIFA to the detriment of 
public interests.  Transparency is often hailed by several researchers as being central to 
citizens’ trust in government as it creates an environment of openness which allows the 
public to monitor the performance of institutions (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012).  Transparency 
creates a positive feeling among the general public which in turn fosters the development of 
trust.  The relationship between the two variables has been discussed lengthily in previous 
studies, but evidence on the nature of the relationship is inconclusive (e.g. Grimmelikhuijsen 
and Meijer, 2014; Laitin and Reich, 2017; Wu, Ma, and Yu, 2017).  While some researchers 
10
believe that transparency and trust are positively related (Song and Lee, 2016), other scholars 
argue that transparency hardly influences trust (Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer, 2014; 
Mabillard and Pasquier, 2016). Others found transparency to exert an inverted U-shaped 
effect on trust, noting that transparency improves trust, but only to a certain point (Horvath 
and Katuscakova, 2016).  Based on the preceding discussion the BM proposes a positive 
relationship between transparency and public trust in the government and in the organizing 
committee of the games (TRA→TG; TRA→TOC).
2.3. Knowledge
Public knowledge of the role and working of an institution is another determinant of 
public trust in that institution (Nunkoo, 2015).  Trust is the result of a cognitive process 
resulting from accumulated knowledge that allows an individual to make judgments about the 
likelihood that the object of trust is indeed trustworthy (Lewis and Weigert, 1985).  As 
Simmel (1978) argues, trust involves a degree of cognitive familiarity with the object of trust 
that is somewhere between total knowledge and total ignorance.  When there is absolute 
ignorance about the object of trust, there can be no reason to trust (Lewis and Weigert, 1985).  
A number of studies suggest a positive relationship between knowledge and public trust.  For 
example, Cook, Jacobs, and Kim (2010) found empirical evidence that increased knowledge 
led to higher levels of public trust in government organizations.  In a tourism context, 
Nunkoo (2015) found that residents who had more knowledge about the role and the 
workings of government displayed a higher level of trust.  Based on this discussion, the BM 
proposes to investigate the relationship between knowledge and public trust in government 
and in the LOC of the games (KW→TG; KW→TOC).
2.4. Competing Models of Public Trust
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The preceding discussion provides theoretical support for the BM which predicts public 
trust from corruption, transparency, and knowledge.  Competing models 1-4 (CM1 – CM4) 
take into account other theoretically plausible relationships among the variables evidenced in 
the literature.  Transparency and knowledge are closely related concepts.  Given that 
transparency involves making information about an organization available publicly to 
individuals and groups outside the organization, it enhances public knowledge about the role 
and workings of the institution (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012; Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer, 
2014).  Furthermore, several authors argue that public knowledge of an institution’s processes 
and performance fosters public understanding by creating a culture of openness, thereby 
reducing perceptions of corruption (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013).  Accordingly, CM1 
proposes a positive relationship between transparency and knowledge (TRA→KW) and an 
inverse relationship between knowledge and corruption (KW → COR), in addition to 
incorporating the paths proposed in the BM.
Transparency is increasingly viewed as central to reducing corruption.  The theoretical 
link between the two variables has been discussed and validated empirically in a number of 
studies (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009; Papyrakis, Rieger, and Gilberthorpe, 2017; Saad and 
Elshaer, 2017).  Accordingly, CM2 proposes an additional relationship between transparency 
and corruption (TRA → COR).  A low level of trust in one institution is usually accompanied 
by a low level of trust in other related institutions (Hetherington, 1998).  Nunkoo’s (2015) 
study demonstrated empirically that public trust in tourism institutions positively influenced 
the general level of public trust in local government.  In this paper, we take the view that the 
level of public trust in FIFA’s local organizing committee influences public trust in the 
Brazilian government in the context of the Games.  Accordingly, CM3 proposes a relationship 
between public trust in the organizing committee of the games and public trust in government 
(TOC → TG).  The BM and CM1 – CM3 predict public trust from corruption.  However, the 
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relationship between the two variables is unlikely to be unidirectional (Dalton, 2004).  For 
example, Morris and Klesner (2010) found a “powerful causality between perception of 
corruption and trust...” (p. 1258).  Wroe et al. (2013) also reported that individuals who are 
less trusting of institutions have stronger perceptions of corruption.  CM4 takes this possibility 
into account and proposes that public trust in the government and in the LOC of the games is 
inversely related to perceived corruption (TG → COR; TOC → COR).
3. Research Methodology
The study relied on data collected from Brazilians residing in the 12 cities that hosted the 
2014 FIFA World Cup six months after the event.  A two-step procedure was used to 
determine the study sample in each hosted city. First, a stratified random sampling approach 
was utilized to determine the sample size for each city.  The number of usable responses 
needed from each city was determined based on a confidence level of 95% and margin of 
error of 6.2% to guarantee that a minimum of 250 valid questionnaires were collected from 
each city.  In cities like São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro which host a larger proportion of the 
population in Brazil, a larger number of questionnaires were collected.  Second, using a quota 
sampling based on gender and age, the number of questionnaires from each stratum was 
determined.  The survey was carried out by trained interviewers employed in a survey 
company.  Residents were intercepted in the most popular locations of the different cities.  
Every tenth person was selected and was asked to participate in the survey.  In a case of 
refusal, the next individual was solicited.  Responses were recorded in a tablet.  To confirm 
validity of the responses, the survey company called around 20 percent of respondents from 
each city after each interviewer submitted the data they collected.  A total of 3,786 valid 
questionnaires were obtained.
3.1. Measurement of Variables
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The scales used to measure the different constructs were borrowed from previous studies 
and are presented in Table 1. Public trust in government and in the LOC of the games were 
measured by five and four items respectively (1 = do not trust them at all; 5 = trust them 
completely) borrowed from Lühiste (2006), Nunkoo (2015), and Shi (2001).  Two items 
adapted from Grimmelikhuijsen (2012), Hung, Sirakaya-Turk and Ingram (2011) and 
Nunkoo (2015) were utilized to measure knowledge.  Transparency was measured using five 
items adapted from Barker and Carter (1994) and Park and Blenkinsopp (2011). Corruption 
was measured using five items borrowed from Park and Blenkinsopp (2011).  In each case a 
five-point Likert scale was used, where 1 represented ‘strongly disagree’ and 5 represented 
‘strongly agree’.  Where necessary, we brought contextual modifications to the scale items.
3.2. Preliminary Statistical Verifications  
Structural equation modelling (SEM) was used to test the models of the study.  Before the 
models were tested, a number of preliminary statistical tests were conducted on the dataset.  
We verified whether missing data presented a threat to the dataset using Little's Missing 
Completely at Random (MCAR) test (Little, 1988).  Results indicated a non-significant chi-
square value, indicating that missing data in the study did not follow any particular pattern 
and were therefore not a threat to the results.  As recommended by Hair, Black, Babin, 
Anderson, and Tatham (2006), we used the mean substitution method for imputation of 
missing data where needed.  We also tested for non-response bias using Armstrong and 
Overton’s method (1977). We compared early respondents (top 10%) with late respondents 
(bottom 10%) on their demographic variables (gender, age, marital status, and education).  
Results from the chi-square tests indicated no significant differences (α = .05) between early 
and late respondents in terms of respondent characteristics.  
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As data were collected using only a face-to-face survey method, we also assessed common 
method variance.  Following Baldauf, Cravens, Diamantopoulos, and Zeugner-Roth (2009), 
we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to examine whether a single factor can 
account for all of the variance in the data.   A CFA with all 20 items loading onto a single 
common factor was estimated.  A chi-square difference test was then performed to compare 
the results of the common factor model with the CFA results of the proposed measurement 
model, which included the five latent factors. The results show that the proposed 
measurement model fits significantly better than the common factor model, suggesting that 
common method variance was not an issue.  We then assessed the normality of the data by 
analyzing kurtosis values which influence analysis of variances and covariances underlying 
SEM. A rescaled value of greater than 7 indicates a departure from normality (West, Finch, 
and Curran, 1995).  Results generated by AMOS indicated that no item had a kurtosis value 




Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) for the variables 
and their respective indicators.  Respondents expressed a neutral view when asked about their 
level of knowledge of the role of government and the LOC in the World Cup Games (x̅ = 
2.97, SD = 1.53).  They generally disagreed that the planning of the event were conducted 
transparently (x̅ = 2.35, SD = 1.50).  Respondents were of the opinion that the event 
planning process was highly corrupted (x̅ = 4.37 SD = 1.09).  They reported a low level of 
trust in government (x̅ = 2.11, SD = 1.30) and in the LOC of the Games (x̅ = 2.16, SD = 
1.31).  
15
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
4.2. Confirmatory Factor Analysis
The models were tested using the recommended two-step approach to SEM (Anderson and 
Gerbing, 1988).  The measurement model was first tested using CFA.  Results indicated a 
significant chi-square value (χ2 = 747.11; df = 148; p < 0.001) which is however known to be 
highly influenced by sample size.  However, the other indices suggested that the model was a 
good fit to the data (TLI = 0.98; CFI = 0.98; RMSEA = 0.03; GFI = 0.97; SRMR = 0.02).  
The measurement model was further evaluated for its reliability and validity.  As shown in 
Table 2, the model achieved reliability because the composite reliability and average variance 
extracted values for all the constructs exceeded the minimum recommended values of 0.70 
and 0.50 respectively (Hair et al., 2006; Nunkoo & Ramkissoon, 2012; Nunkoo et al., 2013).  
We also tested the model for its validity.  Discriminant validity was tested by comparing all 
pairs of constructs in two-factor CFA models, where each model was estimated twice, with 
one constraining the correlation between the constructs to be one and the other allowing free 
estimation of the parameter.  Discriminant validity is achieved if a significantly lower chi-
square value is obtained for the unconstrained model (Bagozzi and Phillips, 1982).  As shown 
in Table 3, this requirement was met, evidencing discriminant validity.  Convergent validity 
was met with statistically significant factor loadings as presented in Table 2 (Anderson and 
Gerbing, 1988).
INSERT TABLE 2 & 3 ABOUT HERE
4.3. Baseline Model versus Competing Models
Given that the measurement model was acceptable, the BM was tested using AMOS 21 
with the maximum likelihood estimation method.  Results indicated a good model fit: (χ² = 
786.368, df = 151, p < 0.001; TLI = 0.98; CFI = .98; GFI = 0.97; AGFI = 0.97; RMSEA = 
16
0.03; SRMR = 0.02; AIC = 904.37; BCC = 905.03).  All the path relationships proposed in 
this model were statistically significant.  Each competing model was then estimated 
individually, with the exogenous variables being assumed to be correlated.  Results are 
presented in Table 4 and indicated that all the competing models exhibited good fit.  In a case 
of equally good fitted models, it is recommended to use a chi-square difference test to 
determine the best model (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988; Rust, Lee, and Valente, 1995).  
Results indicated that the BM was significantly better than CM1 (Δχ² = 319.63; Δdf = 1; p < 
0.001).  Accordingly, we rejected CM1.  
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
The BM, CM2, CM3, and CM4 were found to be equivalent models.  Equivalent models 
produce the same predicted correlations or covariances, but with a different configuration of 
paths among the same observed variables.  Consequently, all goodness-of-fit statistics are 
identical for each of these equivalent models (Kline, 2011; MacCallum et al., 1993).  In such 
a case, the researcher’s selection of the best model should be based on theoretical grounds as 
well as on quantitative criteria (Hershberger, 2006; Kline, 2011).  As the literature offers 
theoretical support for the relationship between trust in the LOC of the games and trust in 
government, we tested this additional path relationship in CM3 and found it to be statistically 
significant.  In addition, as the R2 value is a primary criterion for evaluating the theoretical 
rigor of structural models (Hair, Ringle, and Sarstedt, 2011), we also evaluated the models 
based on this measure. Accordingly, although CM3 has identical fit indices to BM, CM2, and 
CM4, it explained the highest amount of variance in public trust in the government (R2 = 
0.71).  On these bases, we concluded again that CM3 was the best fitted and theoretically 
most rigorous model for our study.  We therefore analyzed the path relationships proposed in 
this model.  Results are presented in Table 5. 
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5. Discussion
Of the 10 path relationships tested in CM3, nine were supported by the findings.  The 
perceived level of corruption in the planning and development of the FIFA World Cup was 
found to exert a strong negative effect on public trust in government.  This finding confirms 
the long standing argument that corruption erodes public trust in institutions (Choi and Woo, 
2016; Pellegata and Memoli, 2016; Torcal, 2014).  Corruption represents a direct violation of 
democratic values and the rule of law, causing distrust among the public (Grimes, 2017; 
Uslaner, 2017).  As our findings indicate, Brazilians reported a very high level of perceived 
corruption in the planning of the Games (x̅ = 4.37).  In a country where corrupt practices 
used to be part of daily business, corruption has today become a negative valence issue of 
great concern to citizens (Weitz-Shapiro and Winters, 2017).  Mass protests over the past 
years demonstrate the depth of Brazilians’ frustration with corruption in the country to such 
an extent that this adversely influences their attitudes toward the government in a sport 
context.  
Interestingly however, while corruption adversely influenced public trust in government, it 
was insignificantly related to their trust in the LOC of the event.  These findings can 
potentially be explained by the fact that citizens consider the government as the principal 
actor in the political process of tourism and related development.  As a result, the public 
holds the government responsible and accountable for all policy decisions even if these are 
the outcomes of government partnerships with other private organizations (Bramwell, 2011; 
Hall, 1994) as in the case of the World Cup Games and other mega-sport events.  In addition, 
the extent of corruption in any public or private organization in a country is dependent on the 
prevailing political culture and the institutional and legal framework in that country which are 
to a large extent determined by the government.  As a result, citizens sanction the government 
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by displaying less trustworthy attitudes in cases of heightened perceptions of corruption.  
While government is answerable to the public, sport organizations are only answerable to 
their members, and to the legal system in appropriate cases.  Furthermore, the government is 
‘closer’ and its activities more ‘visible’ to the citizens than the LOC of the Games.  
Institutions that are more visible to the public take a more prominent role in their mind and in 
consequence, stronger perceptions of corruption in those institutions impede on public trust 
(Nunkoo, 2015).
Our results suggest that citizens perceived a clear lack of transparency in the planning of 
the Games (x̅ = 2.35), lending support to researchers’ argument that secrecy and lack of 
transparency is inherent to mega sport tourism events (Hoberman, 1995; Krüger, 1993).  This 
variable was found to be positively related to public trust in government and in the LOC of 
the World Cup, confirming results of existing studies (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013; 
Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer, 2014).  The findings also lend support to the arguments of 
transparency optimists who stress that transparency is the solution to public mistrust in 
government institutions (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013).  We investigated the relationship 
between transparency and perceived corruption and found a statistically significant 
relationship between the two variables.  As expected, increased transparency was inversely 
related to perceptions of corruption, confirming existing empirical studies (Kolstad and Wiig, 
2009; Papyrakis et al., 2017; Vadlamannati and Cooray, 2017).  
Knowledge was found to be another significant predictor of public trust in government as 
well as in the LOC of the games, confirming the findings of existing research (e.g. 
Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012; Li, 2004; Nunkoo, 2015).  We note here that knowledge of the 
object of trust (i.e. the government and the LOC) is necessary for the development of public 
trust.  From a theoretical standpoint, our result lends support to the long established argument 
that trust is influenced by a degree cognitive similarity between total knowledge and total 
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ignorance, where in the case of absolute ignorance, there is no reason for trust to develop 
(Luhmann, 1979).  Individuals with a greater amount of knowledge about the government 
and the LOC of the games can understand their workings and their respective roles in the 
organization and planning of the event.  Knowledge provides sufficient information that 
allows individuals to make a judgement about the trustworthiness of the trusted (Levi and 
Stoker, 2000).  
We also investigated the relationship between transparency and knowledge and the latter’s 
influence on perceptions of corruption.  Both path relationships were supported by the 
findings.  Transparency was found to positively influence knowledge while an inverse 
relationship was noted between knowledge and corruption.  Transparency relates to the extent 
to which an organization makes available to the public such information as its decision-
making processes, procedures, and functioning.  This enables what Grimmelikhuijsen and 
Meijer (2014) termed ‘inward observability’, which refers to the ability of outside individuals 
and groups to understand and monitor the workings of an organization.  This fosters public 
knowledge, creates a culture of openness, and reduces perceptions of corruption.  However, 
in a sport context, there have been attempts to hold back information from the public.  It is 
common practice for governments and sport organizing committees to suppress public 
knowledge about the real costs of an event to avoid controversies (Long, 2005).  In addition, 
as Henne (2015) argues, “…efforts to disclose the inner workings of sport-related agreements 
have yielded significant pushback” (p. 331).  For example, there was debate among FIFA 
members on whether or not to make available publicly a 430-page report on corruption and 
collusion allegations related to the 2018 and 2022 World Cup bidding processes.  FIFA 
decided to publish only an abridged version of the report.  This decision did not go down well 
with the public as it felt short of the principles of good governance (Henne, 2015).  Citizens’ 
attitudes toward institutions are shaped by underlying democratic values, whereby 
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governments are accountable to their citizens and are expected to act equitably and fairly, and 
where decision-making processes are transparent. Absence of such values adversely 
influences public opinion toward government and its institutions.  FIFA’s actions have thus 
hindered public knowledge and compounded perceptions of corruption as we demonstrate in 
this study.  For these reasons, Transparency International has been calling for the introduction 
of bidding integrity pacts and citizens-monitoring mechanisms to improve governance 
processes in mega sport events.
Furthermore, we tested the effect of public trust in the LOC of the games on public trust in 
the host country’s government.  While there was a clear lack of trust in the LOC (x̅ = 2.16) 
and in the Brazilian government (x̅ = 2.11) in the context of the Games, we found the 
relationship between the two dimensions of trust to be positive. The results confirm the 
domain specificity of trust where individuals usually display varying levels of trust in 
different, albeit related institutions.  We argue that a low level of trust in one institution is 
usually accompanied by a low level of trust in the other institution.  We also found in this 
study that public trust in the LOC spilled over to influence trust in the Brazilian government 
in the context of the FIFA World Cup, confirming existing empirical findings which suggest 
that public trust in one institution affects public attitudes toward a government (Bouckaert 
and Van deWalle, 2001; Christensen and Lægreid, 2005).  Our findings may not be 
encouraging for the Brazilian government or any other nations interested in hosting FIFA 
World Cup Games.  Public distrust in the local organizing committee of FIFA, an 
organization mired in corrupt and questionable practices (Onwumechili and Bedeau, 2017) is 
likely to create a culture of distrust in the host country’s government. 
5.1. Practical Implications
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The results of the study have important practical implications for governments planning to 
host mega sport tourism events.  As our study demonstrates, citizens neither trusted the 
government nor the local organizing committee of FIFA when it came to the planning and 
management of the event.  FIFA is an organization that has generally lacked trust among the 
public.  As Tomaž Vesel, Chairman of FIFA’s Audit and Compliance Committee himself 
states, FIFA needs to be able to rebuild the trust among its internal and external stakeholders 
(FIFA, 2017).  Notwithstanding the initiatives FIFA is undertaking to improve its 
accountability and governance processes (FIFA, 2017) which are indeed encouraging for 
future host governments, the latter should devise their own strategies to gain public trust and 
increase their legitimacy in mega-event planning, evidently, in collaboration with FIFA 
where necessary.  This is critically important because FIFA’s initiatives to improve good 
governance and its image seem to have met with little success (Henne, 2015; Onwumechili 
and Bedeau, 2017).  
Corruption in global sport maps into existing political conditions (Henne, 2015).  It is 
therefore important for government officials to develop a political culture that favors good 
governance and adherence to the rule of law and democratic principles.  As our findings 
indicate, reducing perceptions of corruption, improving transparency, and increasing public 
knowledge of the role of government and the organizing committee in mega-event 
development are pre-requisites to fostering public trust.  Improving transparency will not 
only increase public trust but as our findings demonstrate, is also an effective strategy to 
attenuate perceptions of corruption in mega sport tourism event development.  Transparency 
is made up of policy transparency and decision-making transparency (Grimmelikhuijsen et 
al., 2013).  Policy transparency refers to the information disclosed by a government about the 
policy itself.  Therefore, governments should make publicly available the policies governing 
the mega-event, articulating clearly the public and private partnerships the development 
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process entails, the decision-making processes, the benefits to the country, and the socio-
economic implications for the citizens.  This is an area where considerable work is required 
by host governments because mega events are usually only narrated under the guise of 
delivering economic benefits when in fact such developments usually lead to a 
“reconfiguration of power at the local and national levels” through an imposed “neo-liberal 
order marked by authoritarianism and exceptionalism” (Sánchez and Broudehoux, 2013, p. 
135), engendering corrupt practices.  Policy documents about the development should make 
public-private partnerships visible and open to scrutiny and should consider their far-reaching 
effects on transparency and corruption (Henne, 2015).  Governments can also integrate in the 
policy documents the practices that foster good governance such as those outlined in the 
Transparency International’s Business Principles for Countering Bribery which provides a 
holistic anti-bribery framework.  Government planners can also consider including whistle 
blower protection in policy documents.  Such initiatives are likely to increase transparency, 
reduce the perception of corruption, and improve public trust in government.
As decision-making transparency relates to the degree of openness about how decisions 
are reached, it is important for the host government to ensure a democratic decision-making 
process involving all stakeholders, not just societal and commercial elites.  At present, 
critiques point to how mega event developers partner with governments to develop policies in 
ways that benefit only selected groups of stakeholders (Henne, 2015).  Such practices 
perpetuate the perception of corruption and foster a culture of distrust.  Host governments 
should therefore promote a participatory approach to mega sport tourism event planning, 
involving local communities and other marginalized stakeholders in the process.  The 
government should also provide all information relevant to the event bidding process which 
is often a target for public criticisms because negotiation processes are secretive, intensifying 
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the perception of corruption.  It is important for governments to provide the public with 
factual information about government processes in relation to mega event planning.
Transparency initiatives, particularly information dissemination ones, are also likely to 
enhance public knowledge of the role of government and the local organizing committee in 
mega event development.  As our findings demonstrate, enhanced public knowledge has the 
joint effect of reducing the perception of corruption and fostering public trust.  Therefore, 
improving the knowledge of the citizens through information provision seems to be an 
effective strategy for governments to improve their legitimacy and political accountability in 
mega-event development.  Such information should be credible and reliable as evidence 
points out that citizens usually rely on cues from trusted sources to make judgments about a 
government (Weitz-Shapiro and Winters, 2017).  It is also important that the government 
diversifies the information strategy to communicate with local communities and other 
stakeholders.  For example, information savvy citizens may need detailed and comprehensive 
information about the mega-event while others may require only briefs on the development.  
The government should also be able to target individuals with a lesser interest in and 
knowledge of the mega-event as they are likely to have heightened perceptions of corruption 
and adverse opinions about government’s role in the development, as our findings show.  
Social media such as Facebook and Twitter may be used by governments to encourage 
disinterested individuals to access information about the development as such communication 
modes have been found to enhance perceptions of government transparency and public trust 
(Song and Lee, 2016). Social media is also an effective tool to communicate with and engage 
the younger generation.
5.2. Limitations and Scope for Future Research
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As with any research, this study is not without limitations which readers should take into 
account when interpreting the findings.  We identify three sets of limitations that emanate 
from (1) the research design of the study, (2) the specific socio-economic and political 
conditions of Brazil, and (3) the theoretical basis of the study’s research model.  First, the 
study is based on a survey design which is a non-experimental research approach.  Therefore, 
the findings should be interpreted in the light of the caveats inherent to survey research, 
commonly referred to as the total survey error (Eckman and Leeuw, 2017).  The latter is 
defined as “the accumulation of all errors that may arise in the design, collection, processing, 
and analysis of survey data.  In this context, a survey error is defined as the deviation of a 
survey response from its underlying true value” (Biemer, 2010, p. 817).  Survey errors can 
pose challenges to the reliability and validity of research findings.  A superior method to test 
theories and examine causal relationships is an experimental design approach which is known 
to increase internal validity and, eventually, the robustness of research findings (Bradley and 
Sparks, 2012; Kline, 2011; Namasivayam, 2004).  Future researchers should therefore 
consider using an experimental design to validate the findings of the study.
Second, the specific socio-economic and political conditions of Brazil limit the extent to 
which the findings can be generalized to other economies.  Brazil has a history of corruption 
scandals which has bred a climate of distrust among citizens that in turn feed the perception 
of corruption.  Mega sport tourism events, seen as corrupt by the public may have intensified 
perceptions of corruption and distrust in political institutions.  In addition, Brazil’s 
historically low levels of educational achievement and quality, coupled with the country’s 
relatively short history of democratic competition and multiparty system, make it harder for 
citizens to understand strategic incentives and the behaviors of political actors (Weitz-
Shapiro and Winters, 2017).  These factors may explain the low level of knowledge of the 
respondents reported in this study.  Thus, the socio-economic and political environment of 
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Brazil is likely to have influenced public perceptions of corruption, transparency, and 
Brazilians’ trust in the institutions involved in mega-event development and thus, the 
magnitude of the relationships among the different variables of the study.  It is possible that if 
the model of the study is tested in more transparent and corruption-free societies, the strength 
and directions of the path relationships would be different.  Therefore, the extent to which the 
research findings can be generalized to other societies is limited.  Thus, researchers are 
encouraged to test the model in other countries to validate the findings of the study in other 
contexts.
Third, the research also has a number of theoretical limitations.  The study considered only 
those determinants of public trust that are endogenous to the political system, with the 
rationale that citizens trust those institutions that work effectively and satisfactorily.  
However, political trust in the context of tourism and related development is also culturally 
determined (Nunkoo, 2015; Nunkoo and Smith, 2013; Nunkoo et al., 2012).  For example, 
Grimmelikhuijsen et al. (2013) found that the effect of transparency on political trust is 
culturally dependent.  Brazil shares some of the characteristics of other developing countries 
such as colonial histories and social stratification in terms of race and color which may not be 
present in all developed and industrialized societies.  However, the study did not consider 
these cultural determinants of political trust.  It is therefore recommended that researchers 
consider such antecedents of public trust in mega-event development alongside the 
endogenous ones to strengthen the theoretical basis of their study.  Finally, the study 
considered public trust and its determinants in the context of a one-off and intrusive form of 
tourism development that has massive socio-economic implications for people.  It is 
important that future studies test the path relationships using other forms of tourism 




Hosting of mega sport tourism events such as the FIFA World Cup Games is a political 
act, involving the local communities, public institutions, event organizing committees, and 
other stakeholders who compete over the allocation of resources and distribution of power 
(Horne, 2017).  Consequently, the political ramifications of hosting are very significant.  In 
this article, we investigated the relationships among corruption, transparency, knowledge, and 
public trust using data collected from Brazilians in the context of the 2014 FIFA World Cup 
Games.  In so doing, the study makes an important theoretical contribution to existing 
literature.  While the terms corruption and transparency appear in several articles on mega 
tourism events (e.g. Al-Emadi, Kaplanidou, Diop, Sagas, Le, and Mustafa, 2017; Preuss, 
2015; Kirilenko and Stepchenkova, 2017), to date, there has been no systematic investigation 
of these issues.  As Getz and Page (2016, p. 617) recently highlighted, “There is a clear gap 
in the research on political outcomes of event tourism. These could include corruption, 
changes in government, the evolution of governance (i.e., new models involving 
stakeholders), or the politicization of decision-making about events and tourism.”  Henne 
(2015) also notes that very little is known about the consequences of corruption and 
transparency in mega-event development. Thus, this research makes an important 
contribution to the existing literature, being the first study to set out a theoretical model 
which is tested in the context of a major mega tourism event.  
As the evidence outside the tourism literature points to different theoretical possibilities 
among the constructs, it was important to arrive at a theoretical model of public trust that 
holds most relevance to mega tourism events.  To determine the theoretically most rigorous 
model, the study developed a baseline model and compared it with four competing models 
that reflect other theoretical and sometimes competing propositions among the variables of 
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interest.  The study utilized SEM to compare the different models.  We demonstrated here 
that public trust in government in the context of the mega-event is strongly influenced by 
perceptions of transparency and corruption, citizens’ knowledge as well as their trust in the 
organizing committee of the event.  We argue that while governments can influence the 
internal political culture governing mega-event development through policy reforms, it has 
less control on FIFA’s strategies to boost public trust in the organization.  Complicating the 
issue, are the broad and pluralistic field of mega sport tourism event and the public-private 
sector partnerships such a form of development entails which all present particular challenges 
for transparency and corruption eradication.  Thus, restoring public trust in institutions 
involved in mega tourism events requires multiple stakeholder engagement and political 
willpower.  It is a task that should form a core element of the overall hosting strategy but 
which has often been marginalised.  The findings and conclusions of this pioneering research 
set out useful signposts for host governments.
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Notes – TG: Trust in local government; TOC: Trust in local organizing committee; TRA: Transparancy; COR: 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables and their indicators
Variables and indicators Mean SD
Knowledge 2.97 1.53
I understood the role of local government in the World Cup 3.02 1.56
I understood the role of the organizing committee in the World Cup 2.91 1.56
Transparency 2.35 1.50
The world Cup's works/infrastructures were implemented transparently. 2.20 1.46
The entire process of the World Cup works was transparently disclosed. 2.49 1.55
Local residents could clearly see the progress of World Cup works. 2.51 1.54
The works of World Cup were transparently done. 2.21 1.48
The Government disclosed sufficient information to local residents on the     World Cup 2.34 1.49
Corruption 4.37 1.09
There were malpractices associated with sub-contracts in managing the construction of World 
Cup’s infrastructures 4.33 1.14
There was inappropriate participation of contractors who were under required standards in the 
World Cup's projects in Brazil. 4.40 1.03
There was an atmosphere that something valuable had to be given to the officials in charge to 
smoothly complete the World Cup's infrastructures 4.53 .95
The works of the World Cup in Brazil weren’t fair in some senses. 4.21 1.25
Trust in Government 2.11 1.30
The government to make the right decisions in the events development? 2.23 1.34
The government to do what was right in the event development without you having constantly to 
check on them? 2.32 1.36
The government to look after the interests of the community in relation to this events 
development? 1.88 1.21
Event decisions made by the government? 2.04 1.29
Government’s effort to incorporate residents into event planning process? 2.07 1.29
Trust in Organizing Committee 2.16 1.31
Organizing committee to make the right decisions in the event development? 2.28 1.34
Organizing committee to do what was right in the event development without you having 
constantly to check on them? 2.35 1.36
Organizing committee to look after the interests of the community in relation to this event? 1.93 1.23
Event decisions made by organizing committee? 2.09 1.30
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Table 2. Properties of the measurement model
Variables and indicators SL t-
values
CR AVE
Knowledge   0.81 0.68
I understood the role of local government in the World Cup 0.82 -
I understood the role of the organizing committee in the World Cup 0.83 23.34***
Transparency 0.88 0.59
The world Cup's works/infrastructures were implemented transparently. 0.81 -
The entire process of the World Cup works was transparently disclosed. 0.75 43.82***
Local residents could clearly see the progress of World Cup works. 0.73 41.10***
The works of World Cup were transparently done. 0.88 53.37***




There were malpractices associated with sub-contracts in managing the 
construction of World Cup’s infrastructures
0.87 -
There was inappropriate participation of contractors who were under 
required standards in the World Cup's projects in Brazil.
0.84 28.55***
There was an atmosphere that something valuable had to be given to the 
officials in charge to smoothly complete the World Cup's infrastructures
0.79 24.92***
The works of the World Cup in Brazil weren’t fair in some senses. 0.52 23.21***
Trust in Government 0.85 0.54
The government to make the right decisions in the events development? 0.74 -
The government to do what was right in the event development without you 
having constantly to check on them
0.73 54.63***
The government to look after the interests of the community in relation to 
this events development?
0.74 43.11***
Event decisions made by the government? 0.73 42.97***
Government’s effort to incorporate residents into event planning process? 0.71 41.67***
Trust in Organizing Committee 0.84 0.58
Organizing committee to make the right decisions in the event development? 0.75 -
Organizing committee to do what was right in the event development 
without you having constantly to check on them?
0.73 58.90***
Organizing committee to look after the interests of the community in relation 
to this event?
0.77 40.07***
Event decisions made by organizing committee? 0.79 41.68***
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
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Table 3. Discriminant validity 
Constrained model Unconstrained model Chi-square differenceComparisons
χ2 df χ2 df Δχ2 Δdf
Discriminant validity
KW TRA 296.23 10 40.04 9 256.19 1 yes
COR 62.68 8 45.18 7 17.5 1 yes
TG 269.89 11 29.16 10 240.73 1 yes
TOC 196.41 6 9.15 5 187.26 1 yes
TRA COR 2411.68 21 43.26 20 2368.42 1 yes
TG 166.06 28 44.36 27 121.7 1 yes
TOC 242.97 20 84.26 19 158.71 1 yes
COR TG 2669.02 23 56.37 22 2612.65 1 yes
TOC 2613.93 19 539.79 18 2074.14 1 yes
TG TOC 427.36 21 388.54 20 38.82 1 yes
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Table 4. Baseline model versus competing models
Model χ² df Δ χ² Δdf TLI CFI RMSEA SRMR AIC BCC
Baseline 786.37 151 Base comparison N/A .98 .98 .03 .02 904.37 905.03
CM1 1106.00 152 319.63 1 .97 .97 .04 .06 1222.00 1222.65
CM2 786.37 151 N/A N/A .98 .98 .03 .02 904.37 905.03
CM3 786.37 151 N/A N/A .98 .98 .03 .02 904.37 905.03
CM4 786.37 151 N/A N/A .98 .98 .03 .02 904.37 905.03
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Table 5. Results of path relationships in CM3
Path relationship Standardized beta Critical ratio Results
COR → TG -.21 -10.04*** Supported
COR → TOC .03 1.60 Rejected
TRA → TG .44 21.41*** Supported
TRA → TOC .05 2.56* Supported
TRA → COR -.37 -15.86*** Supported
KW → TG .20 11.23*** Supported
KW → TOC .08 4.91*** Supported
TRA → KW .27 13.66*** Supported
KW → COR -.04 -2.01* Supported
TOC → TG .50 25.07*** Supported
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
